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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK FUOCO and ANN A 
FUOCO, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS and 
VERNA V. WILLIAMS, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 
9860 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County entered on a special verdict 
of a jury in a boundary line case. 
The plaintiffs brought this suit against the defend-
ants to quiet title to a tract of land located in Salt Lake 
County, specifically described in the complaint, to en-
join the defendants from trespassing and for damages. 
The defendants answered and counterclaimed alleging 
ownership and right of possession of a specifically 
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described tractof land and praying for injunctive relief 
and damages. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a sum-
mary judgment based on a affidavit and map which 
indicated that an overlap of approximately 20 feet was 
created by a tie to a "county monument in the inter-
section of two county roads" which first appears in the 
defendants' chain of title in a deed to the defendants 
dated October 31, 1950. (R. 7-9). 
After hearing, the trial court grant the motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had 
record title to the 20 feet. However, the court permitted 
the filing of an amended answer and counterclaim 
to plead title by adverse possession and acquiescence. 
(R. 10). Such amended pleading was filed. (R. 14-17). 
At the pre-trial conference the court ruled that before 
the defendants could present evidence upon the issue 
of adverse possession "they must supply the plaintiffs 
with a copy of the tax description showing description 
of the property under which they claim to have paid 
taxes ... at least ten days prior to trial." (R. 19-21). 
This was not done. The only remaining issue was title 
by acquiescence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The twenty-foot strip of land in dispute is shown 
on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "'ABCD", "AB" being 
the boundary line claimed by the defendants and "CD" 
being the line claimed by the plaintiffs. (R. 56). The 
property in question is located near the intersection of 
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Highland Drive and 3900 South. There was no fence 
along either the line AB or CD until a few weeks prior 
to the filing of the suit when the plaintiffs put fence 
posts along CD. These were removed by the defend-
ants, who constructed a fence along AB. (R. 64, 65, 
86, 87). This precipitated the suit. 
The testimony of the defendant B. H. Williams 
is set out rather fully because the appellants' claim that 
no title by acquiescence was proved, and that if there 
is proof anywhere in the record, it is by this testimony. 
(R. 57). 
Q. Mr. Williams, I ask you if for at least the 
last twenty-five years you are acquainted 
with every use that has been made of this 
property, including this twenty-foot strip, on 
which you live. 
A. I have used it and cultivated it, plowed it 
and harrowed it or had it plowed and har-
rowed and pulled the weeds out, hoed it, cul-
tivated it, treated it up to the present time. 
Q. For how many years have you done this your-
self? 
A. Since 1934. 
Q. And has any other person to your knowledge 
made any use of that Iand-
A. No, sir. 
Q. -lying east of the fence? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I ask you, Mr. Williams, if during all of 
this twenty-five year period, if you know, 
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whether a ditch has been in existence just 
immediately west of your fence line. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I ask you, sir, if that ditch had any rela-
tionship to the boundary line you old timers 
recognized. 
MR. SKEEN: If the Court please, I object 
on the ground that it is leading and calling 
for a conclusion of the witness. 
THE COURT: Well, he may answer if it 
had any relationship. Of course, he may 
state without direction what the relationship 
was. 
Q. Did this old ditch I asked you, Mr. Williams, 
if you know, have any relationship to a bound-
ary line between the old timers' properties 
and that you and your father claimed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I ask you, Mr. Williams-
THE COURT: Now, before we leave that, 
in view of his objection, let's pursue that 
and ask him what that relationship is. 
Q. How was this ditch used, if at all? 
A. For an irrigation ditch. 
Q. Yes. How was it used, if at all, as a boundary 
marker? 
A. Well-
MR. SKEEN: I object on the ground that 
it's obviously a leading question, Your 
Honor. 
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THE COURT: Well, you may answer what 
use you made of the-
MR. SKEEN: Calls for conclusion. 
THE COURT: -ditch. Did you use any 
water out of the ditch 1 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Did you cultivate up to the 
ditch? 
A. Yes, sir. I didn't use the water out of that 
ditch on the east side. ( R. 59) . 
Mr. Williams testified that the ditch had been 
located "along the west side of the property" for about 
twenty-five years. (R. 63). Mr. Fuoco first claimed to 
own land east of the ditch in 1960. That was the first 
year he can1e into the neighborhood. (R. 63). On cross-
examination Mr. Williams testified that the location 
of the ditch had been changed several times. ( R. 71-
72). An effort was made to relate the location of the 
small lateral which Mr. Williams claimed ran along 
the line AB to an old fence which ran north and south 
of the road or lane now known as 3970 South. Mr. 
Williams testified as follows: 
Q. Do you know where that fence was located 
with respect to the flume under-the ditch 
passed through and going under the lane 1 
A. Right at the corner. 
Q. Right at the corner? 
A. Northeast corner of that or south-yes-be 
southeast corner of that section over there. 
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Q. In other words, the flume-
A. Northwest corner of the other-
Q. -the flume was at the southeast corner-
A. Of the old-
Q. -of the old fence, right on the south end of 
the old fence? 
A. Yes, sir. (R. 74). 
On redirect Mr. Williams testified the ditch was 
on the west side of the fence (constructed in 1962) for 
twenty-five years. 
The plaintiffs' witnesses Young and Sanders tes-
tified that the old ditch crossed the lane near a fence 
which is marked by three crosses in red pencil on Ex-
hibit P-1 (opposite the line CD) and that it then pro-
ceeded directly south. (R. 91, 113, 115). The ditch 
was "done away with" in 1954 when a neighbor to the 
south (Hanson) constructed a fence across it. (R. 92, 
118). 
The land now owned by plaintiffs was leased by the 
defendant Williams for a number of years. He culti-
vated it, put it in potatoes, tomatoes and corn, and 
irrigated it from the ditch in question (R. 114, 115). 
Most of the time the Fuoco property was just up in 
weeds .. ( R. 134) . The testimony regarding common 
operation of the two properties by Williams, and the 
fact that most of the time it was "just in weeds" is not 
contradicted in the record. 
Mr. Young testified also that until 1941 or 1942 
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there was a barn east of the common boundary line and 
that the land was used only for deposit of refuse. (R. 
137). This was not denied. 
The trial court ruled as a rna tter of law that the 
defendants had proved title by acquiescence, and sub-
mitted to the jury one question, and that was regarding 
the location of the ditch which was claimed as the visible 
monument which established the boundary line. This 
appeal is taken from the judgment on the special 
verdict signed by the Clerk of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The defendant did not establish a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
2. The court erred in refusing to submit to the 
jury the issue of title by acquiescence. 
3. The special verdict was erroneous, self contra-
dictory and confusing, and the judgment based thereon 
is not supported by the verdict or by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ESTAB-
LISH A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
As indicated above, the trial court granted a sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the record 
title to the disputed twenty-foot strip was in the plain-
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiffs. The defendants amended alleging title by adverse 
possession and title by acquiescence. The adverse pos-
session theory was ruled out by failure to show pay-
ment of taxes. ( R. 20) . The only issue left in the case 
was title to the disputed area by acquiescence. 
This Court has held that in order to make a case 
under the acquiescence doctrine, it must be shown: 
( 1) There was uncertainty as to the location of 
the true boundary. 
( 2) The parties have occupied their respective 
parcels up to an open boundary line, visibly marked 
by monuments, fences or buildings. 
(3) The monument, fence or building must have 
existed for a long period of time. 
( 4) The monument, fence or building must have 
been mutually recognized as the dividing line. 
King v. Fronk, 378 P. 2d 893; Brown v. Milliner, 
232 P 2d 202, 120 Utah 16; Glenn v. Whitney, 209 P 
2d 257, 116 Utah 267; Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P 
2d 1053, 2 Utah 2d 119; Hummel v. Young, 265 P 2d 
410, 1 Utah 2d 237. 
In the case of King v. Fronk, supra, the court 
referred to the boundary marked on the ground as 
"monuments visibly placed", "monumented line", and 
an "existing line marked by monuments". There never 
having been a fence on the disputed boundary until 
a few \Veeks before the trial, the only basis for acqui-
10 
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escence in this case was considering the irrigation ditch 
to be a "monument" within the meaning of the rule . 
.. A .. monument is defined by the dictionary as "per-
manent landmarks established for the purpose of indi-
cating boundaries." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third 
Edition. 
Obviously an irrigation ditch is not ordinarily con-
structed for the purpose of marking a boundary. It 
is used for carrying· water to the place of use and must 
be constructed to conform to the· slope and contour 
of the land and to connect with other ditches and lat-
erals. An irrigation ditch would not give notice to one 
who views it that it would establish a boundary line as 
in the case of a fence or building. If we assume for the 
sake of argument that the land in each tract was occu-
pied up to a small ditch, such as the one involved here, 
this fact alone would not put the·parties upon notice of 
intent to claim ownership to the ditch. A landowner 
"could not irrigate up hill from a ·ditch" and the fact 
that his neighbor used the land to the ditch could easily 
be explained as a neighborly act or a grant of license. 
There is no evidence in the record that either the 
defendants or the plaintiffs or their predecessors treated 
the ditch as a boundary. The only testimony which by 
any stretch of the imagination bears on the subject 
is Mr. Williams' statement that he used and cultivated 
the land on which he lives, including the twenty-foot 
strip since 1934. The court directed leading questions 
to the witness as to whether the ditch had any relation-
11 
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ship to the boundary line, and the witness only testified 
that the ditch was used as an irrigation ditch. See p. 
6 of this brief. 
Much of the testimony at the trial relates to the 
location of the ditch. Mr. Williams testified that it 
was located on the west side of "my fence line." (R. 63). 
On cross examination Mr. Williams was reminded that 
the fence had been built just before suit was commenced 
and he was asked to tie the location of the ditch to an 
old fence line which has persisted many years on the 
north side of the lane. The fence is marked on Exhibit 
PI by three red cross marks and is directly opposite 
the boundary line CD claimed by plaintiffs. Mr. Wil-
liams testified that the ditch in question crosses under 
the lane "right on the south end of the old fence". (R. 
7 4) . This is exactly where plaintiffs' witnesses said it 
was located. (R. 92, II3, II5, I26, I27, I29, I30). It 
is significant that all located the ditch on the line CD 
on Exhibit PI when describing the ditch location with 
reference to the old fence north of the lane (3970 
South) which has existed in the same location as far 
back as I924. (R. I26). Mr. Williams testified at one 
point in the trial: "The ditch has been changed quite 
a few times in there. I don't know just exactly where 
it comes." (R. 7I). Mr. Young testified that the ditch, 
which the defendants attempt to use as a monument, 
was "done away with" in I954. (R. 92). This is not 
contradicted. 
The ditch involved was small. The flume under 
12 
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the lane has a two-by-twelve top on it. (R. 93). This 
means the flume was 12 inches wide. 
It is highly significant with regard to defendants' 
claim that the ditch was the dividing line to refer briefly 
to the testimony of Owen C. Sanders, who moved next 
door to the Fuoco property in 1935. He testified that 
for "probably ten years" the Fuoco property was leased. 
Mr. 'Villiams leased the property, now owned by Fuoco, 
for a number of years and used the ditch in question 
to irrigate the Fuoco property. (R. 114-115). Most 
of the time the Fuoco property was "just up in weeds". 
(R. 134). Also witness Frank Young testified that 
the irrigation ditch crossed the road about ten or fifteen 
feet west of an old barn and while the barn was there 
they threw out refuse, manure and apples between the 
barn and the ditch. There was no garden in the vicinity 
of the ditch. (R. 137). The barn was torn down in 
1941 or 1942. (R. 138). 
This testimony regarding the use of the land west 
of the barn is not disputed, and such use continued to 
1941 or 1942. There obviously was no cultivation up 
to the ditch during this period. After the barn was torn 
down, there was only a period of 12 to 13 years when 
it would have been possible for either party to claim 
the ditch was the dividing line. This is not long enough. 
King v. Fronk, supra. Also the ditch falls short of the 
requirement of a "visible boundary of ancient vintage 
and persistency of placement." King v. Fronk, supra. 
In view of the failure of the defendants to prove 
13 
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the continued existence of a monument definitely estab-
lishing a boundary line, and mutually recognized as 
such by the parties, it is submitted that the trial court 
erred in holding as a matter of law that there was a 
boundary by acquiescence. The Court erred in denying 
the plaintiffs' timely motion for a directed verdict for 
the plaintiffs upon the ground that there was no evi-
dence showing acquiescence in a common boundary line. 
(R. 144). 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF 
TITLE BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
If we assume for the sake of argument only that 
there was some evidence of acquiescence, we contend 
that the factual issues of elements of title by acquies-
cence should have been submitted to the jury. Appro-
priate requests for instructions were made by plain-
tiffs, and were refused. ( R. 23, 24) . Exceptions were 
taken. (R. 147, 148). 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that when a jury has been demanded, the trial of all 
issues so demanded shall be by the jury. Rule 52 pro-
vides that in all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury the Court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law. In this case the court 
refused to submit all issues to the jury, and did not 
make separate findings, conclusions and judgment as 
required by the rule. The court obviously should have 
14 
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done one thing or the other. This was error which re-
quires reversal. 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT WAS ERRO-
NEOUS, SELF CONTRADICTORY AND CON-
FUSING AND THE JUDGMENT BASED 
THEREON IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
VERDICT OR BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court ignored the obvious issues of fact 
involved in proving a title by acquiescence including 
such issues as mutual recognition of a common bound-
ary line marked by a monument, and the issues as to 
the number of years, if any, when such a marked and 
visible boundary line was so recognized, and instructed 
the jury that ''Mr. Williams is entitled to the land 
up to the east side of that ditch." This was error. It is 
stated in the form of verdict, "there is only one question 
and that is the location on the ground of the east bank 
of the original ditch through which the Fuoco property 
was irrigated." The court did not define in the verdict 
what he meant by the "original ditch". The word 
"original" was not used by the witnesses, and the ques-
tion is so vague it is meaningless. There is testimony 
of the course of the ditch from above Highland Drive 
to a point near the south end of the Fuoco property. 
The ditch runs east and west and north and south. In 
the second and third paragraphs of the special verdict 
the court points out that the jury cannot find the east 
bank of the ditch to be west of the line AB. The answer 
15 
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of the jury is, "The ditch runs North and South, just 
west of A and B line on exh. No. 1." 
The verdict ignores the instruction of the court 
that the line cannot be west of AB. It is indefinite. 
What do the words "just west" mean? How far? A 
foot or two feet? No one knows. 
The judgment on the special verdict signed by 
the clerk spells out that "the northwest corner of which 
division line is 295.02 feet west of the center of High-
land Drive, and extends thence south 165 feet between 
the property of plaintiffs, and the property of defend-
ants, which are involved herein which said point is like-
wise about two feet west of an existing fence ... "The 
judgment then goes on to specifically describe the 
property involved. The first part of the description, 
it will be noted, is the same as that in the amended 
answer and counterclaim which has two starting points 
and describes two different areas. The latter part of 
the description ties to the "east bank of the irrigation 
ditch existing between the properties of the plaintiffs 
lying west of said point and those of the defendants 
lying east of said point ... " (Emphasis added). 
The uncontradicted evidence is that the ditch relied 
upon as the boundary was destroyed in 1954. It is not 
"existing". There is no evidence of a tie of 295.02 feet 
from the center of a county road. Exhibit PI shows by 
the irregularly shaped areas in red pencil and plain 
pencil, the confusion caused in the description of de-
fendants' land by the two starting points in the de-
16 
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scription, one being "at a point North 1010.60 feet and 
East 1134.15 feet from the Southwest corner of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Sec-
tion 33", and the other being "at a point South 14 o 
24' 30" East 717.26 feet from a county monument in 
the intersection of two county roads." There is abso-
lutely no evidence in the record to support the descrip-
tion contained in the judgment. Also, the judgment is 
void because it goes beyond the special verdict, purports 
to interpret the meaning of the words "just west" and 
purports to make findings, conclusions and a decree, 
all of which are judicial functions. It is signed by the 
clerk. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
must be reversed. The District Court should be directed 
to enter a judgment for the appellants. 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
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